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John R. McRae (1947-2011)
 
A Pivotal Text for the Definition of the Two Hindrances in 
East Asia: Huiyuan’s “Erzhang yi” Chapter 
A. Charles Muller 
1   Introduction 
Buddhism, especially in its meditative forms, is unique among religious 
traditions for the attention that it pays to the psychological aspect of hu-
man problems, and for the extent to which it distinguishes these prob-
lems into the categories of emotional and cognitive. While the general 
patterns of this distinction between these two aspects of mental function 
are discernible in early Buddhism, and become clearer in Abhidharmic 
scholasticism,1 it is not until the maturation of the Mahāyāna that afflic-
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 Although the explicit division of all mental disturbances along the general lines of 
afflictive vs. cognitive is seen mainly in the Mahāyāna systems of Yogâcāra and Tathā-
gatagarbha, we begin to see the formation of precursory structures in Abhidharma 
texts, where, for example, the afflictive hindrances (fannaozhang 煩惱障) are estab-
lished in contrast to the hindrances to liberation (jietuozhang 解脫障). In this case the 
afflictive hindrances refer to the manifestly active afflictions that serve to obstruct the 
production of undefiled wisdom, and thus obstruct attainment of liberation through 
wisdom (huijietuo 慧解脫). However, even if one overcomes these hindrances and is 
able to attain liberation through wisdom, he may still be obstructed by the subtler hin-
drances to liberation, which impede the attainment of the concentration of total ces-
sation (miejinding 滅盡定). Thus, the latter type (also known as the “cessation hin-
drances”, dingzhang 定障) are said to impede both types of liberation (ju jietuo 倶解脫). 
The former are seen as being constituted by defiled ignorance (wuran wuzhi 染汚無知), 
and the latter by undefiled ignorance (buwuran wuzhi 不染汚無知). In the *Abhidhar-
ma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (Apidamo piposha lun 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), the first two of the 
four kinds of correct elimination (si zheng duan 四正斷) remove the first kind of hin-
drance and the second two remove the second kind of hindrance (T27:1545.724b29). 
218 Muller  
 
tive and cognitive obstacles to liberation are formally organized under 
the rubrics of the “two hindrances” – the afflictive hindrances (kleśa-āva-
raṇa, fannaozhang 煩惱障) and the cognitive hindrances (jñeya-āvaraṇa; 
zhizhang 智障, suozhizhang 所知障2). 
While the two hindrances are understood by many scholars as hall-
mark concepts of the Yogâcāra school, they are actually broad Mahāyāna 
categories, and as we will see here, the process of refinement and flesh-
ing out of their contents was in some cases more extensive within the 
texts of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition. 
1.1   Parameters for the two hindrances 
Throughout the Mahāyāna texts where the hindrances are invoked, their 
most common function is to serve as a means of distinguishing the con-
tent of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna paths. The general characterization 
describes the practices of the adherents of the two vehicles (śrāvakas and 
pratyekabuddhas) to be limited in their focus and application of contem-
plation to the afflictive hindrances, while the practices of the bodhisat-
tvas can be applied to both. In Yogâcāra, this accords with the basic doc-
trine that understands that the practitioners of the two vehicles are limi-
ted in their enlightenment to the realization of selflessness, i.e. recog-
nition of anātman, and thus only attain the Hīnayāna nirvāṇa, whereas 
the bodhisattvas penetrate further, to the realization of śūnyatā, and can 
hence attain bodhi equal to the buddhas. While the Tathāgatagarbha 
texts do not define the causes of the hindrances so clearly in terms of 
this model of attachment to the selfhood of persons and dharmas, their 
descriptions of the hindrances basically agree with this general frame-
work. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
2 The rendering zhizhang (智障) is found in both pre-Xuanzang Yogâcāra and Tathāgata-
garbha texts. Suozhizhang (所知障) is used in Xuanzang’s translations and becomes 
standard in subsequent works in the East Asian Weishi (唯識) tradition. It should be 
noted, however, that Zhiyi (智顗) had already applied the connotation of “the known” 
(suozhi, 所知) in the sixth century in his rendering as suozhiai (所知礙). See, for ex-
ample, T46:1911.85c18.  
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The development of a comprehensive systematic description of the 
hindrances in both Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha occurs rather late in 
comparison with the finalization of other facets of their respective doc-
trines. The hindrances are mentioned only rarely and sketchily at first, 
but then with increasing frequency in a broad range of texts over a peri-
od of a couple of centuries. At the earliest stages, the hindrances are 
mentioned with almost no explanation, usually as simple markers to in-
dicate the completion of a certain set of practices, or the attainment of a 
certain stage. I have outlined the general progression of the two hin-
drances framework in the Yogâcāra system in another work (Muller, 
2013), so I will just summarize it briefly here.  
In the Yogâcāra system proper (as accepted by Kuiji [窺基, 632–682] 
and his colleagues) the hindrances are mentioned only briefly, and with 
no serious intention of establishing a system, in the Saṃdhinirmocana-
sūtra, Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra (hereafter YBh), and Mahāyānasaṃgraha.3 The 
Madhyânta-vibhāga, while featuring an entire chapter entitled “The Two 
Hindrances” (the second chapter), articulates the hindrances in a way 
that barely relates to the rest of the Yogâcāra system at all. The full and 
complete definition of the two hindrances as they end up being taught in 
the Weishi (唯識) system appears in Xuanzang’s (玄奘, 602?–664) trans-
lation of the Fodijing lun (佛地經論, *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra, T1530, 
hereafter FDJL). This definition is copied almost verbatim into the Cheng 
weishi lun (成唯識論, T1585, hereafter CWSL), with a few minor, but very 
interesting tweaks. 
As is now fairly well known, the most comprehensive articulation of 
two hindrances systems in the known history of Buddhism was carried 
out by the Korean scholiast Wonhyo (元曉, 617–686) in his Ijang ui (二障
義, “System of the Two Hindrances”, hereafter IJU).4 This substantial 
-------------------------------------------------- 
3 This does not mean, however, that the phenomena of affliction and nescience are not 
discussed in great detail in these texts – especially the YBh. For in fact, Wonhyo relies 
on the YBh more than any other text in his fleshing out of the two hindrances within 
the Yogâcāra system. Nonetheless, the hindrances are rarely labeled as such there.  
4 I have published an English study and translation of this text in the volume entitled 
Wonhyo’s Philosophy of Mind (Muller, 2012a), which is part of a series-in-progress that 
aims at providing scholarly translations of all of Wonhyo’s extant works.  
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treatise (twenty-five pages in the Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo 韓國佛教全書 – 
translating out to over 200 pages in English), started out as a digression 
written in the process of the composition of a commentary to the Awak-
ening of Mahāyāna Faith (大乘起信論 T1666, hereafter AMF), but grew to 
such a length that Wonhyo apparently decided to publish it separately. 
The IJU is of critical importance, not just for hindrances discourse, but 
for its thorough, non-sectarian analysis of East Asian Buddhist philoso-
phy of mind at that point in history, in that Wonhyo was one of the first 
to clearly identify and discuss the two major forms of Mahāyāna philo-
sophy of mind in a thoroughgoing, comparative, and impartial manner.5 
These two are what we now call the Yogâcāra tradition (viz., Yogâcāra as 
understood by the East Asian Weishi/Faxiang lineage, established based 
on such works as the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, YBh, FDJL, etc.), and the 
Tathāgatagarbha tradition (in East Asia largely developed out of the Di-
lun 地論 tradition, based on such texts as the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra [hereaf-
ter ŚDS], Ratnagotravibhāga, AMF, etc.). 
Wonhyo’s work is typically thorough. He first distinguishes hin-
drances discourse into these two main streams, calling the Yogâcāra sys-
tem the “explicit” (xianliao men 顯了門; nītârtha) approach and the 
AMF’s system and approach, which “requires further explanation” (yinmi 
men 隠密門; neyârtha). He constructs a system for each of these, based 
on the prominent texts from within their respective traditions. Then – as 
is typical for Wonhyo – he tries his best to find the ways in which key 
elements of the two systems can be matched up with each other. To flesh 
out the Yogâcāra system, he relies primarily on Xuanzang’s recent-
ly-completed translations of the YBh, Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, Mahāyāna-
saṃgraha and so forth. And although he does not cite the FDJL by name, it 
seems that he must have had access to some draft of this text, or perhaps 
a draft of some of its counterpart passages that were to be included in 
the CWSL, as portions of these critical passages – the most important in 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5 Basically, Wonhyo was the only major scriptural commentator of the period who did 
not belong to, and did not in an unbalanced way support, a particular school of Bud-
dhism. I discuss this important aspect of Wonhyo’s career in Muller and Nguyen 
(2012a): 24–42.  
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forming the final definitions for the hindrances in the Weishi system – 
appear in the IJU unidentified.6 
For his articulation of the AMF’s system of the hindrances, Wonhyo 
relies on Tathatāgarbha-oriented works such as the ŚDS, the Ratnagotravi-
bhāga, and works central to the Dilun school, such as the Bodhisattvabhū-
mi-śāstra (菩薩地持經 T1581, hereafter BBh), along with the AMF. Those 
familiar with the course of translation history in East Asian Buddhism 
will recognize that there is also a difference of almost a century in the 
texts being relied on to establish these two systems, with the texts for 
the Yogâcāra system being almost exclusively the translations of Xuan-
zang, and the texts for the Tathāgatagarbha system being works that 
were for the most part available a century or more earlier. 
In terms of relative degree of systematicity between the two systems, 
it is fairly easy to map out an orderly structure for the Yogâcāra system 
once one has access to the detailed articulation of the hindrances that 
appeared in the FDJL and CWSL, as one can then work from this material 
to locate textual support and to flesh out the development in prior Yogâ-
cāra texts such as the Ybh; hence Wonhyo’s label of “explicit”. Doing the 
same for the Tathāgatagarbha system is not as easy, since where Weishi 
Yogâcāra is eminently systematic, the Tathāgatagarbha texts do not in 
themselves readily form such a tight doctrinal system when it comes to 
describing the causes, factors, paths, and antidotes that are related to 
nescience and affliction. Despite this difficulty, Wonhyo, engaging in  
“further explanation” creates a reasonably systematic map for the Ta-
thāgatagarbha hindrances. But he had some help. 
The earliest effort in East Asia to thoroughly define and systematize 
the hindrances was made by Jingying Huiyuan (淨影慧遠; 523–592) in 
the form of a chapter in his Dasheng yi zhang (大乘義章, T1851, hereafter 
DSYZ) entitled Erzhang yi (二障義) – the same title chosen by Wonhyo for 
his IJU (Huiyuan’s text is translated in full below, p. 236 ff.). The essay in 
the DSYZ is copied as-is (aside from the unfortunate new insertion of a 
few dozen scribal errors) into Huiyuan’s commentary on the AMF, the Da-
-------------------------------------------------- 
6 While Wonhyo (like most of his scholarly colleagues of the period) did not consider it 
especially important to cite fellow exegetes, he was especially meticulous – and 
unusually accurate – in his citation of scriptural sources.  
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sheng qixin lun yishu (大乘起信論義疏 T1843, hereafter DQLY).7 This dis-
cussion, occupying three full pages in the Taishō canon, appears as a 
long digression within the commentary. In the AMF itself, the hindrances 
are invoked in a terse and cryptic manner, with almost no explanation. It 
is obviously the cryptic aspect of this presentation, along with its disso-
nance with the clearly articulated Yogâcāra framework, that motivated 
Wonhyo to conduct his own inquiry. In the case of Huiyuan’s commen-
tary, it would appear that when he (or his ghost writer) arrived at the 
cryptic section on the hindrances in the process of the commentary on 
the AMF, he copied in the essay that had been previously written in the 
DSYZ, adding a few sentences before and after for contextualization. 
Around the same time (and probably a little after), Zhiyi (智顗, 538–
597) composed a much shorter, but nonetheless valuable analysis of the 
hindrances in his Mohe zhi guan (摩訶止觀, T1911).8  
1.2   Discrepancies 
In a general sense, the systems of the two hindrances are quite similar in 
their structure and function in Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha. In both 
cases they serve to distinguish between afflictive and cognitive problems. 
Both systems also generally agree that the afflictive hindrances can be 
remedied by the practices of Hīnayāna adherents, whereas cognitive hin-
drances can only be removed by the compassion and insight into empti-
-------------------------------------------------- 
7 In 1972 Yoshihide Yoshizu questioned the accuracy of the attribution of Huiyuan’s 
authorship of the commentary to the AMF (Yoshizu, 1972) and was later supported by 
Akira Hirakawa in his Daijō kishin ron (Hirakawa, 1973: 399). The argument presented 
there is sufficient to concede that this commentary was probably composed after Hui-
yuan’s time. Nonetheless, no one disputes the probability that it was written by a per-
son or persons intimate with Huiyuan’s thought, quite possibly one or more of his stu-
dents, and thus represents his essential teachings. For the sake of simplicity, we will re-
fer to this text as “Huiyuan’s Commentary”.  
8 See T46:1911.85b22–c22. This piece was the object of a study by Paul Swanson (1983). 
Huiyuan and Zhiyi are roughly contemporaneous, and it is not possible to know with 
precision who wrote first, but since Zhiyi’s piece seems to be at least in part a distilla-
tion of the far more thorough work by Huiyuan, I am working under the assumption 
that Zhiyi read Huiyuan, and not vice versa.  
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ness possessed by bodhisattvas. They are also subjected to and inter-
twined with the whole range of other concepts that these two systems 
hold in common, such as the role and extent of perfuming (xunxi 薰習); 
distinctions between manifest activity and latency; embeddedness at 
various depths of consciousness; their removal at certain stages of the 
path; and their treatment by the primary antidotes of śamatha and vipaś-
yanā. 
There are also a few telling problematic areas in defining the hin-
drances that the two traditions have in common, and their respective 
approaches to the resolution of these can tell us much about their dis-
tinctive interpretations of the function of consciousness and the applica-
tions of practice. One of the most prominent of these problems is the 
very basic matter (in Yogâcāra) of identifying any given negative mental 
factor as being specifically afflictive or cognitive. In many cases the cate-
gorization of an affliction is obvious (such as lying, jealousy, etc.); but 
there are mental factors, such as views (jian 見),9 doubt (yi 疑), and 
pride (man 慢), which in Yogâcāra are usually labeled as afflictions, but 
which also have obvious cognitive dimensions. 
Another question that arises is that regarding the limitations in po-
tential attainment assumed regarding the practitioners of the two vehi-
cles, who (as virtually every single reference work tells us) are only capa-
ble of removing the afflictions, and not the cognitive hindrances. Does 
this mean that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are utterly incapable of 
dealing with cognitive issues, and that the cognitive problems dealt with 
by bodhisattvas are entirely bereft of afflictive implications? Finally, 
how firm is the line between these two broad categories of hindrances? 
Do they not in some way influence each other, or function like each 
other? If so, to what extent? 
-------------------------------------------------- 
9 I have discussed the special case of views (dṛṣṭi) in considerable detail in Muller (2011).  
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2    The Tathāgatagarbha system of the hindrances as explained by 
Huiyuan 
These were precisely the sorts of questions that seem to have impelled 
Huiyuan to conduct his investigation of the hindrances – an investiga-
tion the likes of which was unprecedented at his time. Mainly, he wanted 
to understand how the Mahāyāna viewed and defined the relationship 
between the afflictive and the cognitive. What he found out was that 
there was not a single set position or framework. The understanding of 
this relationship depended on a variety of factors, including: to what 
system the practitioner was an adherent (Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna); how far 
he or she was along the path; what kinds of antidotes were being applied, 
and even the context of any given discussion. 
Huiyuan establishes the precedent (later followed by Wonhyo and 
scholars of Tiantai 天臺 and Huayan 華嚴) of explaining the basic 
framework of the hindrances relying primarily on the doctrine of the 
four afflictive entrenchments (si zhudi 四住地) and the nescience en-
trenchment (wuming zhudi 無明住地) as first articulated in the ŚDS, and 
later invoked in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Bao xing lun 寶性論), Foxing lun 
(佛性論), and so forth. The four entrenchments10 as taught in these Ta-
thāgatagarbha texts can be understood as four underlying bases from 
which manifestly active afflictions are generated – and which retain the 
afflictions when they are in a dormant state. In other words, they are the 
latent aspects of the hindrances – comparable in connotation to the con-
cept of bīja (seeds) in Yogâcāra.11 In the ŚDS they are contrasted with ac-
tive, or “arisen” afflictions (qifannao 起煩惱 – analogous to the Yogâcā-
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 My translation of zhudi (住地) as “entrenchment” follows that established by Alex 
Wayman in his translation of the ŚDS (Wayman, 1974). However, Wayman only used 
the term entrenchment in conjunction with nescience, referring to the four afflictive 
types as “static defilements”. It seems to me that the meaning of entrenchment can be 
usefully applied in both cases, thus my present rendering. See Wayman, 1974: 84, n. 56. 
Diana Paul’s rendering as “stages” does not seem to reflect a useful understanding of 
the meaning of this concept; Paul, 2004: 32.  
11 This matching of the entrenchments with the notion of seeds is done in the CWSL, in a 
passage that will be cited below. 
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ra active afflictions, chan 纏 or xianxing fannao 現行煩惱). The four en-
trenchments are: 
1. jian yichu zhudi (見一處住地) entrenchment of identity-view (lit. 
“seeing a single basis”).12  
2. yuai zhudi (欲愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to objects in the 
desire realm. 
3. seai zhudi (色愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to things in the 
form realm. 
4. youai zhudi (有愛住地) entrenchment of attachment to objects in 
the formless realm. 
The fifth entrenchment is entrenched nescience (wuming zhudi 無明住
地; avidyâvāsa-bhūmi), referring to nescience in its latent aspect as some-
thing innate and deeply embedded in the mind, which is extremely 
difficult to remove. It serves as the basis for the other four entrench-
ments, and thus forms the basis for the production of afflictions. When 
entrenched nescience is added to the previous four, they are spoken of 
as the five entrenchments (wu zhudi 五住地).13 
Taking these five entrenchments as his basic framework, Huiyuan 
perceives in the source texts a sliding scale of three levels of interpre-
tation, wherein the border between afflictive and cognitive steadily ad-
vances toward the cognitive end. These are: 
1. The first level, which is the most straightforward and readily appre-
hensible, is the one that takes the four afflictive entrenchments (si 
zhu fannao 四住煩惱) to be directly equivalent to the afflictive hin-
-------------------------------------------------- 
12 Based on various commentarial characterizations of this entrenchment, I take it as 
equivalent to the Yogâcāra notion of satkāya-dṛṣṭi – or at least, self-view. For example: 
“How does one at the mundane level eliminate the afflictive hindrances? As the DBh 
explains: ‘At the first ground one eliminates the self-hindrance of worldlings. The self 
of worldlings is equivalent to the entrenchment of identity-view;’” 云何世間斷煩惱障。
如地論説。初地斷除凡夫我障。凡夫我是見一處住地 (DSYZ T44:1851.563c28–29; see 
Translation §3.3.2.1.1 below).  
13 The locus classicus for this structure is the ŚDS T12:353.220a1–8.  
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drances, and the nescience entrenchments to be directly equivalent 
to the cognitive hindrances. 
2. In the second approach, the intrinsic natures of all five entrench-
ments are collectively understood to constitute the afflictive hin-
drances, while the inability to properly cognize distinct phenomena 
(shizhong wuzhi 事中無知) constitutes the cognitive hindrances. In 
this approach, nescience is distinguished into two types: confusion 
in regard to principle, and confusion in regard to distinct pheno-
mena. Huiyuan identifies this interpretation as equivalent to the 
presentation of the hindrances in the AMF (T44:1843.191a29). 
3. In the third approach, the essences of the five entrenchments, as 
well as obscuration of cognition in regard to both principle and phe-
nomena, are taken to be the afflictive hindrances, leaving only the 
function of object-discriminating cognition itself as the cognitive 
hindrances (T44:1843.188c3–9).  
Rendered schematically: 
afflictive hindrances 
(fannaozhang 煩惱障) cognitive hindrances (zhizhang 智障)  
four entrenchments of 
afflictions (si zhufannao 四住煩惱)  
nescience entrenchments (wuming 
zhudi 無明住地)  
natures of the five entrench-
ments, plus confusion in regard to 
principle (wu zhuxingjie 五住性結 + 
mili wuming 迷理無明)  
nescience in regard to distinct 
phenomena (shizong wuzhi 事中無知)  
natures of the five entrench-
ments, plus nescience in regard to 
principle and phenomena (wu 
zhuxing 五住性 + shiwuzhi 事無知 
+ mili wuming 迷理無明)  
object-discriminating cognition (fenbie 
yuanzhi 分別緣智)  
At the first level, cognitive problems are clearly distinguished from af-
flictive problems. But as we move to the second and third levels, the 
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cognitive hindrances tend to be constituted by a narrower and subtler 
slice of the cognitive, with relatively coarse cognitive functions tending 
toward relegation in the afflictive category. At the second level, cogni-
tive error is defined as delusive object-discriminating cognition, and at 
the third level, as object-discriminating cognition itself. 
The straightforward afflictive/cognitive distinction provided at the 
first level, which separates the nescience entrenchments from the four 
entrenchments of desire and aversion toward the world, can be readily 
mapped in a general way to the basic Weishi-Yogâcāra explanation – 
which Wonhyo will later label as the “explicit” (nītârtha) approach.14 The 
second level is the one that Huiyuan maps to the description of the hin-
drances in the AMF (T44:1843.191a29). This is in general the category 
that Wonhyo will later label as the approach “requiring further explana-
tion” (yinmi men 隱密門). 
Interesting here is the third level, which is not directly discussed by 
Wonhyo. This is the definition where all five of the entrenchments, plus 
obscuration of both principle and phenomena, comprise the afflictive 
hindrances, with the cognitive hindrances consisting only of ob-
ject-discriminating cognition. The bar is again raised, such that the cog-
nitive hindrances are identified in their impedimentary effect to an even 
narrower range of mental function, one that in itself usually carries no 
inherent negative connotations at all. One could argue, however, that it 
is not incommensurate with the basic view in the Tathāgatagarbha texts 
that any movement of the mind whatsoever is impedimentary to the en-
lightenment of the Buddha. In terms of textual sources for these three 
types of interpretation, it is not the case that one interpretation refers to 
a reading given in any particular text, or family of texts. It is a matter of 
Huiyuan perceiving a certain way of explaining the relationship between 
various forms of defilement and cognitive distortion from different sec-
tions in what is sometimes even the same text. Nonetheless, it does indi-
cate that although Wonhyo seems to have developed the core part of his 
-------------------------------------------------- 
14 The explanation given to this category, found both in the ŚDS and in Huiyuan’s com-
mentary on the AMF, locates the practitioners of the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas 
in positions analogous to that found in the Yogâcāra explanation, in terms of their abi-
lity to deal with the hindrances. See T12:353.220a13–15.  
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“neyârtha” explanation following Huiyuan’s previous work, there are dif-
ferences between the two in terms of their schemas of the hindrances, 
since, although the first level can be fairly easily mapped to that of the 
standard Yogâcāra model, and the second to the AMF, the third is proble-
matic.15 
Huiyuan’s analysis constitutes, until the time of Wonhyo’s IJU and 
Xuanzang’s translation of the FDJL, the most highly developed articula-
tion of the two hindrances of any kind in East Asia, since, as noted, none 
of the sutras or śāstras available at that time, in Tathāgatagarbha or Yo-
gâcāra, contain any systematic discussion comparable to this. From the 
East Asian perspective, the fully developed Yogâcāra/Weishi definition 
of the hindrances (in the FDJL, CWSL, etc.) actually appears after that of 
the crystallization of the Tathāgatagarbha version in the form of Hui-
yuan’s above-introduced work. In fact, we even have cause to wonder if 
Huiyuan’s work may have spurred some Yogâcāra scholars into action on 
this matter. As I discuss fully in Muller (2013), there is a radical leap in 
precision and detail in the systematic articulation of the hindrances in 
the texts of the Weishi-Yogâcāra tradition. That tradition starts with the 
vague and sketchy passages found in the Saṃdhinirmocana, YBh, and Ma-
hāyānasaṃgraha, and then makes a sudden leap to the comprehensive 
systematic exposition seen in the FDJL and CWSL. There is no pure Yogâ-
cāra text at our disposal containing an intermediate level of develop-
ment of a hindrances system that would readily serve as a bridge be-
tween these two stages. Yet during this interim period, the model of the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
15 This difference between the two systems has been again pointed out by Seok, 2010. 
Seok shows the distinctive aspects of Huiyuan’s interpretation vis-à-vis that of the AMF 
and that of the Dilun school, of which he was considered a representative. Dr. Seok has 
made a valuable contribution to this discussion, but I do think that his attempt to set 
me up as a straw man, by insinuating that I have claimed that Wonhyo copied Hui-
yuan’s theory as-is, is disingenuous, as I have repeatedly pointed out the differences 
between Huiyuan’s and Wonhyo’s approaches on this matter (and did so again in 
Muller [2006], which he cites). And while he asserts that the matter of Huiyuan’s influ-
ence on Wonhyo should be “reconsidered”, he conveniently chooses not to discuss the 
portion of Huiyuan’s work that I (and others) have identified as having the most obvi-
ous influence on Wonhyo: Wonhyo’s usage of the structure of the four entrenchments 
(si zhudi 四住地) and the nescience entrenchment (wuming zhudi 無明住地) in defin-
ing the framework of the indirect interpretation.  
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hindrances in the Tathāgatagarbha texts undergoes significant develop-
ment in such works as the ŚDS, Ratnagotravibhāga, Benye jing (本業經), 
AMF, and most importantly, in the analyses of Huiyuan and Zhiyi. Given 
this fact, it may be quite possible that even if the masters of the Yogâ-
cāra/Weishi school did not really want to apply the Tathāgatagarbha 
structure to their own articulation of the hindrances, they may have felt 
pressure to flesh out their own argument to demonstrate their own level 
of sophistication on the matter. Argumentation attempting to support 
this will be given below. 
3   The completed Yogâcāra system of the hindrances 
Since I have already elaborated the history of the development of the 
Weishi-Yogâcāra system of the hindrances (Muller, 2012a, 2013), I will 
not repeat that information again here. The reader should mainly be 
aware that there is no fully developed systematic explanation of the hin-
drances in East Asia until the appearance of Xuanzang’s translation of 
the FDJL (repeated in the CWSL), and that version has been handed down 
to the present, through Wonhyo and others in Korea, and in such works 
as the Kanjin kakumushō (觀心覺夢鈔, T2312) in Japan. As articulated in 
Yogâcāra works, the term afflictive hindrances refers primarily to all the 
mental factors (xinsuo 心所) that are of unwholesome (bushan 不善) 
quality – which bring suffering and anxiety to sentient beings. Included 
here are the factors enumerated in such categories as the six fundamen-
tal afflictions (liu fannao 六煩惱) and twenty secondary afflictions (sui-
fannao 隨煩惱), along with their further derivatives. In the most stan-
dard Yogâcāra definition (as one will find in the YBh, FDJL, CWSL, etc.), 
the afflictive hindrances are said to originate in the view of the selfhood 
of persons (wozhi 我執, wojian 我見; ātma-grāha, ātma-dṛṣṭi, etc.). They 
are said to be eliminated by the practices of the śrāvakas and praty-
ekabuddhas. The cognitive hindrances are said to be derived from the 
fundamental error of understanding phenomena (dharmas) to have in-
trinsic reality (fazhi 法執, fawozhi 法我執; dharma-grāha). They are con-
ceptual errors, the most subtle of which can only be permanently elimi-
nated by bodhisattvas who have a thoroughgoing awakening to empti-
ness. The cognitive hindrances serve as the basis for the afflictive hin-
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drances. The five levels of Weishi practice (weishi xiudao wu wei 唯識修
道五位) are distinguished in terms of the bodhisattva’s ability to quell 
and eliminate the active manifest forms, seed forms, and karmic impres-
sions of these two kinds of hindrances. 
The FDJL has a couple of fairly long sections that treat the hindrances 
in detail from the most important perspectives, including their content, 
function, and removal. It is quite clear that the summary of the hin-
drances in the CWSL is derived directly from the FDJL, or from a common 
source – one that was also apparently accessible to Wonhyo, as many of 
the descriptions of the hindrances found in the FDJL also appear in simi-
lar, but unreferenced, form in the IJU. 
However, the CWSL contains one vitally important line that shows us 
that Huiyuan’s work was read by Xuanzang and his circle, and was con-
sidered important enough for mention, even though they did not for-
mally consider it as part of their own tradition. The critical passage on 
the hindrances in the CWSL starts as follows: 
煩惱障者。謂執遍計所執實我薩迦耶見而爲上首、百二十八根本煩
惱、及彼等流諸隨煩惱。此皆擾惱有情身心能障涅槃名煩惱障。 
What are the afflictive hindrances? With the attachment to the per-
vasive imputations of an identity-view attaching to a true self at their 
head, [they include] the 128 fundamental afflictions,16 as well as all 
the derivative afflictions that flow out from them. Since they all bring 
discomfort to the bodies and minds of sentient beings, and are able to 




What are the cognitive hindrances? With the attachment to the per-
vasive imputations of an identity-view attaching to real dharmas at 
-------------------------------------------------- 
16 This labeling of the 128 afflictions as “fundamental”, as seen in the FDJL and CWSL, is 
unusual, as the term genben fannao (根本煩惱) in these and other Yogâcāra texts al-
most always refers to the six fundamental afflictions, which are followed by the 
twenty-odd derivative afflictions (ershi suifannao 二十隨煩惱).  
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their head, views, doubt, nescience, attachment, anger, pride and so forth 
obscure the undistorted nature of objects of cognition, and are able to 
obstruct bodhi. Therefore they are called the cognitive hindrances 
(T31:1585.48c10–12; emphasis mine).  
It is of critical importance to note here that in listing “views, doubt, ne-
science, attachment, anger, pride, and so forth”, a set of mental factors 
from the same set of fundamental afflictions has been included in both the 
afflictive and cognitive categories of mental disturbances, which means 
that a careful reader who is intimate with the Yogâcāra system of the 
hindrances should be aware of a considerable unexplained overlap be-
tween afflictive and cognitive here. This does not go unnoticed by Kuiji, 
who explains this by saying that although these afflictions are listed in 
both places, we should understand that there are differences in their 
subtlety, intensity, and amount in each situation.17 Interestingly, this 
way of explaining away the ambiguity is not all that different from the 
way that Huiyuan deals with the same problem. And in fact, the author 
of this passage (Xuanzang?) is himself well aware of the ambiguity, and 
feels compelled to address it below. This brings us to the next passage, 




If the cognitive hindrances include views, doubt, and so forth, how is 
it that this type18 [of mental factor] is explained in the scriptures as 
-------------------------------------------------- 
17 See T43:1830.560c1–4.  
18 An anonymous reviewer strongly advocated the rendering of ci zhong (此種) here as 
“these seeds”, following la Vallée Poussin’s rendering (Francis Cook also rendered it 
this way). However, I do not think that these venerable scholars, nor my reader, had 
the opportunity to be fully tuned into the two-hindrances issues that contribute to 
this discussion, where the issue is the categorization of certain types of hindrances as 
afflictive or cognitive; it is not an issue pertaining to their latency. Such a rendering al-
so reflects a lack of familiarity with Yogâcāra two hindrances discourse. Where the 
hindrances are discussed as being in a latent state, the terminology usually employed 
is that of suimian (隨眠; Skt. anuśaya). They are rarely discussed from the perspective 
of seeds. 
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[being included in] the nescience entrenchments?19 As the effects of 
nescience expand, [these too] are generally termed nescience. Views 
and so forth are not excluded. [On the other hand, in] the case of hin-
drances of the afflictive type constituting the four entrenchments of 
identity-view, and attachment to desire, form, and formlessness,20 
how could they lack pride or nescience [which are understood in the 
CWSL as cognitive hindrances]? (T31:1585.48c23–26; emphasis mine). 
This is a very interesting passage – one somewhat rare in the CWSL. First, 
“the scriptures” (qijing 契經) being referred to are obviously the ŚDS 
(and perhaps the Ratnagotravibhāga). But in fact, those sutras, while in-
troducing the entrenchments, do not actually go as far as mapping the 
entrenchments to either afflictive or cognitive hindrances. This is done 
by Huiyuan, which means that the editor of this section of the CWSL was 
well aware of Huiyuan’s scheme – which has here apparently even 
achieved the status of scriptural authority! Since the corresponding pas-
sages in the FDJL, which seem to be the source of this material in the 
CWSL, contain everything else except this statement, this has to be an in-
sertion made at the time of the composition of the CWSL, in response to 
this specific concern. And while we would not be especially surprised to 
see notes to this effect in later commentaries by Kuiji et al. (and there 
are), to see mention here of the Tathāgatagarbhic entrenchments, in this, 
the definitive text of East Asian Weishi-Yogâcāra Buddhism, is notable. 
This is just one of many examples of the difficulties that Xuanzang and 
his colleagues were having in dealing with the scriptural authority of 
Tathāgatagarbha-oriented texts. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
19 However, the “scriptures” being invoked here are not the orthodox Yogâcāra works, 
such as the Saṃdhinirmocana – it would be a reference to the ŚDS, or the Ratnagotra-
vibhāga. The main point is that these mental functions do not fit into that framework, 
since there they are seen as afflictions existing outside of the nescience entrench-
ments.  
20 Youai zhudi (有愛住地) refers to attachment to existence itself, regardless of form. In 
some texts this is rendered as wuseai zhudi (無色愛住地). See, for example, the Huayan 
wujiaozhang zhishi (華嚴五教章指事) at T72:2337.261c2 and the Tiantai sijiao yi (天台四
教儀) at T46:1931.779c1. 
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Thus, between Huiyuan’s analysis of the hindrances, based on Tathā-
gatagarbha texts, and the CWSL’s analysis, based on Yogâcāra texts, we 
have a basic disparity in understanding the meaning of, and relationship 
between, afflictive and cognitive obstructions. 
As noted above, this point ends up, for obvious reasons, being inter-
twined with a couple of related issues, which are: (1) Is it true that the 
practitioners of the two vehicles do not remove the cognitive hindrances 
at all? And are the bodhisattvas handicapped when it comes to dealing 
with afflictions? (2) Are the hindrances really two strictly separate cate-
gories? Or do cognitive and afflictive problems influence each other? If 
so, to what extent?  
The commentators of both traditions quite readily concede that they 
certainly do function in both ways, but they do not necessarily agree on 
the depth of the overlap. Regarding point #1, the CWSL says: 
二乘但能斷煩惱障。菩薩倶斷。永斷二種唯聖道。 
The practitioners of the two vehicles are only able to remove the af-
flictive hindrances. The bodhisattvas remove both. It is only the holy 
path that is able to permanently eliminate both kinds (T31:1585.48
c29).21 
Huiyuan takes a more nuanced position, when he writes (cf. Translation 
below, §1.3.1.1): 
The adherents of the two vehicles only remove the afflictive hin-
drances, and only bodhisattvas extinguish the cognitive hindrances. It 
is not the case that the adherents of the two vehicles do not partially 
remove the cognitive hindrances. But since the hindrances that are 
removed are negligible, the subtle is de-emphasized in favor of the 
coarse, and thus they are not discussed. It is not the case that the bo-
dhisattvas do not remove afflictions. But since those that are removed 
-------------------------------------------------- 
21 Note that this somewhat rigid categorization, which disallows any removal of cogni-
tive hindrances by adherents of the two vehicles, does not hold true for all of Yogâcāra. 
As we will see below, Wonhyo cites passages from the YBh that acknowledge that the 
practitioners of the two vehicles eliminate some cognitive hindrances. Kuiji also takes 
a looser position in his comment on this passage, acknowledging that the line is not so 
hard and fast. See T43:1830.562c17–19.  
234 Muller  
 
are relatively insignificant, the coarse is de-emphasized in favor of 
the subtle, and therefore they are not mentioned. (T44:1843.188c29–
a2).  
On the other hand, regarding point #2, that of the mutual relationship 
between the hindrances, the CWSL allows for a virtual overlap in func-
tion between the two, saying: 
所知障亦障涅槃。如何但說菩提障。說煩惱但障涅槃。豈彼不能障
菩提。應知聖教依勝用說。理實倶能通障二果。 
The cognitive hindrances also obstruct nirvāṇa. Why is it said that 
they only obstruct bodhi? And it is said that the afflictions only ob-
struct nirvāṇa. How could they not be capable of obstructing bodhi? 
You should know that the holy teaching relies on the most prominent 
function in explaining the matter. In principle, both are able to over-
lap in their obstruction of the two realizations (T31:1585.56a3–6).  
This in itself would seem to problematize the rigid position taken above 
regarding the distinctions between adherents of the various vehicles. 
Nonetheless, on this present point, the CWSL has no disagreement with 
Huiyuan, who in fact explains it even more clearly, when he writes (cf. 
Translation below, §1.2): 
Why is it that the four entrenchments are together labeled as the 
afflictive hindrances, and nescience alone is taken to constitute the 
cognitive hindrances? 
Answer: In principle, they actually function to obstruct both. How-
ever, in this case, in order to distinguish between the two hindrances, 
certain aspects are emphasized or de-emphasized in their naming. In 
the proper application of emphasis and de-emphasis, each receives its 
own name according to its most prominent function. The binding of 
the four afflictive entrenchments in their active state instigates acti-
vity that gives rise to distress. Since this connotation is strong, the 
tendency is to call them afflictions. The mental disturbances in the 
minds of unenlightened beings are substantially different from liber-
ation. But their distant obscuration of cognition is weak and hence 
they are not called cognitive hindrances. Nescient obscuration direct-
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ly distorts clear understanding, and closely shrouds. Here the mean-
ing of cognitive obstruction is strong, and hence they are called cog-
nitive hindrances. Innate nescience is not active here, and is not able 
to instigate activity or invite painful retribution. The distress it brings 
about is slight, and thus it is not called afflictive hindrances (T44:1843.
188c18–25).  
Thus, both Huiyuan and the CWSL readily acknowledge the fact that the 
naming of the hindrances refers to their more prominent tendencies, 
and that at a deeper level of analysis, it is obvious that they cannot be 
separated out from each other. 
4   Observations 
We have focused here on a very narrow set of categories, through which 
we attempted to shed some light on the interactive character of the 
development of the two hindrances in Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha 
thought. Evidence of mutual influence and cross-fertilization is some-
what obvious, in the sense that the vast majority of what each of the two 
traditions have to say about the hindrances is not at odds with the other. 
Most telling in this regard is the shared understanding that both descrip-
tions of the hindrances are a kind of prajñapti – a designatory label used 
to indicate distinctions among things that in reality cannot be clearly 
discriminated. The human mind, after all, cannot be cut into pieces, any 
more than reality can be cut into pieces with distinctions between the 
two truths, essence and function (tiyong 體用), or emptiness and exis-
tence, all of which just refer to distinctive aspects within a larger whole. 
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Mental disturbances have four kinds of substance: (1) entrenched nesci-
ence; (2) active nescience;24 (3) the four entrenchments [of affliction]; (4) 
the four states of activity [of affliction]. Among the four, entrenched ne-
science is definitely not concomitant [with mind]. As is explained in the 
ŚDS: As for beginningless entrenched nescience not being concomitant 
-------------------------------------------------- 
22 Note on the translation: The source for this translation is DQLY (Dasheng qixin lun yishu 
大乘起信論義疏, T1843), the commentary on the AMF attributed to Huiyuan (T44:
1843.188b11-191a28). Ideally, it would have been more efficient to use the version of 
the text contained in DSYZ (T44:1851.568b18-564b28). Not only is DSYZ the probable 
origin of the analogous section in DQLY, but DSYZ is also free from most of the scribal 
errors contained in DQLY. It just happened that I became aware of the secondary ver-
sion in DQLY first, and had edited it extensively before finding out about the version in 
DSYZ. Nonetheless, the version in DQLY has some important supplementary material 
attached (see §4 of the translation below), so working from it is not without its uses. In 
the process of the translation, I compared the text of DQLY to DSYZ, correcting and 
annotating the scribal errors.  
23 Obviously wei (位) here is used for zhu (住).  
24 Fully written as wuming zhudi (無明住地). This is nescience in its latent aspect as 
something innate and deeply embedded in consciousness, which is difficult to remove, 
and which serves as the basis for the production of afflictions (Skt. avidyâvāsa-bhūmi). 
This category iscussed at length in the ŚDS, the Benye jing, and this text. It is explained 
as being a broad category under which the four distinct entrenchments (si zhudi 四住
地) are subsumed. When the nescience entrenchment is added as a separate item to 
the previous four, they are spoken of as the five entrenchments (wu zhudi huo 五住地
惑). Sanskrit is known from citation of the ŚDS in the Ratnagotravibhāga; Johnston 
(1950): 33–34, Takasaki (1966): 217. 
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with mind: since the mental substance of the deluded consciousness is 
nescience, it is not concomitant. The sutra explains that which is arisen 
prior to nescience as being concomitant.25 Therefore the ŚDS says that 
when it is active, affliction is momentarily concomitant. Yet if we inves-
tigate the meaning carefully, we can also discern an interpretation that 
allows for concomitance. How do we know this? In this treatise [the AMF], 
the activity consciousness,26 transforming consciousness,27 and mani-
fest consciousness28 are defiled without being concomitant with the 
mind. The discriminating consciousness29 and the continuing conscious-
ness30 are defiled and concomitant. Yet since all five of these are pro-
duced by nescience, they are also interpreted as being non-concomitant. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
25 The discussion of the nescience entrenchment (wuming zhudi 無明住地) in the ŚDS is 
at T12:353.220a2–b28. 
26 The “activity consciousness” (yeshi 業識) in the AMF is the mental state where, 
through the agency of nescience, an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed. Be-
cause of the nescience that does not perceive that the suchness of all dharmas is origi-
nally equal and of a single taste, there is the rising of this unenlightened, mistakenly 
conceptualizing consciousness. It is the first of the five kinds of consciousness ex-
plained in the AMF. The following four are also mentioned here in sequence. See 
T32:1666.577b7. 
27 In the AMF, the “transforming consciousness” (zhuanshi 轉識) is a mental state where 
with awareness having been stirred, the external world enters into consciousness. 
This is the second of the three subtle marks (san xi 三細) of mental evolution. See T32:
1666.577b8.  
28 The manifesting consciousness (xianshi 現識) or “representation-consciousness” in 
the AMF refers to the perception of an external world; the aspect of consciousness as 
reflecting the myriad forms in the objective realm, the way a clear mirror reflects all 
the objects that appear in front of it. This is the third of the three subtle marks (san xi 
三細) taught in the AMF. T32:1666.577b10.  
29 The discriminating consciousness (zhishi 智識) is a subtle form of cognition that is 
capable of differentiating pure and impure dharmas in the objective realm. It is the 
fourth of the five kinds of consciousness taught in the AMF. Wonhyo correlates it with 
the manas (seventh) consciousness taught in Yogâcāra. T32:1666.32.577b12; HBJ 1.763
c8. 
30 In the system of the AMF, the continuing consciousness (xiangxushi 相續識 – which 
Wonhyo correlates to the Yogâcāra mental consciousness – mano-vijñāna 意識) is 
thinking that continues unbroken without cessation. For example, once a deluded 
thought arises, it continues without limit, thus carrying karma along with it. This is 
the fifth of the five kinds of consciousness taught in the AMF. T32:‌1666.577b13. 
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問曰。若爾、勝鬘何故一向說爲相應。 
Question: If this is the case, then why does the ŚDS consistently maintain 






Answer: In order to specifically distinguish nescience, [the ŚDS] just fo-
cuses on one aspect. When one explains roughly the general aspects of 
the four entrenchments, they are said to be concomitant with the mind. 
If one investigates the meaning in detail, both interpretations are inclu-
ded. Active mental disturbances are all concomitant with the mind. In-
nate mental disturbances share the same essence with the mind, and are 
said to be non-concomitant. It is based on this interpretation that within 
the *Saṃyuktâbhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra, one master says that [the mental 
disturbances] are definitely concomitant with the mind, and another 
says that [they] are not.31 Since this doctrine has both aspects, we 
should not attach to one of them. The active afflictions produced from 
the four entrenchments are uniformly concomitant. This is because they 
arise in a coarse manner distinguished from the mind. Therefore the ŚDS 
says that the active afflictions produced from the four entrenchments 
are momentarily concomitant.32 This treatise elucidates the interpreta-
tions of concomitance and non-concomitance from the perspective of 
the deluded consciousness.33 
-------------------------------------------------- 
31 See T28:1552.907b20-22. My thanks to Michael Radich for locating this reference. 
32 See, for example, T12:353.220a5.  
33 “Deluded consciousness” (wangshi 妄識) is a general term commonly seen in dis-
course related to the AMF, referring to the mind that has moved from the original con-
dition of thusness. This is correlated to the Yogâcāra notion of the mind as influenced 
by the belief in the inherent reality of objects (dharma-grāha), or in the belief in the re-
ality of the self (ātma-grāha), and thus is usually a reference to the sixth (mano) con-
sciousness, or the seventh (manas) – or both taken together.  






There now follows the fourth section, where the two hindrances are ex-
plained. The previously-elucidated six levels include both hindrances.34 
[In the AMF] fundamental nescience is taken to be the cognitive hin-
drances, and everything after the activity consciousness is taken to be 
the afflictive hindrances. Yet these two hindrances merit a detailed ela-
boration. To wit, the two hindrances are the great net that keep sentient 
beings submerged in birth and death; they are the source of myriad men-
tal disturbances, the hard barrier that blocks the road to nirvāṇa. Since 
they hinder the holy path, they are called “hindrances”. While the hin-







The first are the afflictive hindrances; the second are the cognitive hin-
drances. These two hindrances have three levels of interpretation. In the 
first, the afflictive entrenchments comprise the afflictive hindrances and 
the nescience entrenchments comprise the cognitive hindrances. In the 
second, the binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature 
constitutes the afflictive hindrances; ignorance36 in regard to phenome-
-------------------------------------------------- 
34 It is not immediately clear here what “six levels” might refer to, since in the above 
section, five levels of consciousness were mentioned, and five entrenchments. There is 
a possibility that Huiyuan could be referring to the six coarse aspects of mind (liucu 
六麤) of the AMF. 
35 Following DSYZ, correcting xu (緖) to jie (結).  
36 Throughout this translation, for purposes of consistency, I have translated wuming (無
明) as “nescience”, and wuzhi (無知) as “ignorance”. It is not clear from the text that 
any significant difference in connotation is expressed by the usage of these two terms, 
but it seems to be a good idea to separate them. 
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na constitutes the cognitive hindrances. There are two kinds of nesci-
ence: the first is the nescience of confusion in regard to principle; the se-
cond is ignorance regarding phenomena. At the third level, the binding 
of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature as well as igno-
rance in regard to phenomena comprises the afflictive hindrances; dis-
criminating conditioned cognition constitutes the cognitive hindrances. 
Starting from the first level, I will analyze each in four ways: (1) deter-
mining the characteristics of the hindrances; (2) defining their termino-
logy; (3) clarifying the levels of their removal; and (4) the application of 
their antidotes. 
1   First level 






In defining their characteristics, how do we know that the four en-
trenchments of affliction comprise the afflictive hindrances and the en-
trenchment of nescience comprises the cognitive hindrances? We can 
test this by juxtaposing the ŚDS with the BBh. The ŚDS teaches that the 
adherents of the two vehicles are only able to eliminate the four en-
trenchments, and are unable to eliminate the nescience entrenchment.37 
In the BBh it is explained that the adherents of the two vehicles cleanse 
themselves of the afflictive hindrances but not the cognitive hin-
drances.38 This “cleansing of the afflictive hindrances” is equivalent to 
-------------------------------------------------- 
37 阿羅漢辟支佛智所不能斷。恆沙等數上煩惱依。亦令四種煩惱久住; “It is something 
that the cognitive acuity of the arhats and pratyekabuddhas is unable to eliminate. It is 
the basis for virulent afflictions more numerous than the grains of sand in the Ganges. 
It also allows the four kinds of afflictions to abide permanently” (T12:353.220a13–14).  
38 何以故。有二種淨。一者煩惱障淨、二者智障淨。二乘種性煩惱障淨、非智障淨。
菩薩種性具足二淨; “How so? There are two kinds of cleansing. The first is the clean-
sing of the afflictive hindrances and the second is the cleansing of the cognitive hin-
 The Two Hindrances: Huiyuan’s “Er zhangyi”  241 
 
the removal of the entrenchments of afflictions in the ŚDS. The “non-
cleansing of the cognitive hindrances” is equivalent to the non-elimina-
tion of the entrenchment of nescience. Hence we know that the four en-
trenchments are equivalent to the afflictive hindrances and the nesci-
ence entrenchment is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances. 
1.2   Explanation of terminology 
次釋其名。五住之結通能勞亂、齊能障智。何故四住遍名煩惱障、
無明獨爲智障。 
Next is the explanation of terminology. The bindings of the five en-
trenchments are all able to bring about distress as well as hinder cogni-
tion. [Question:] Why is it that the four entrenchments are together la-
beled as the afflictive hindrances, and nescience alone is taken to consti-






Answer: In principle, they actually function to obstruct both. However, 
in this case, in order to distinguish between the two hindrances, certain 
aspects are de-emphasized or emphasized in their naming. In the proper 
application of emphasis and de-emphasis, each receives its own name 
according to its most prominent function. The binding of the four afflic-
tive entrenchments in their active state instigates activity that gives rise 
to distress. Since this connotation is strong, the tendency is to call them 
afflictions. The mental disturbances in the minds of unenlightened be-
ings are substantially different from liberation. But their distant obscur-
ation of cognition is weak and hence they are not called cognitive hin-
-------------------------------------------------- 
drances. Those who have a nature inclined toward the practice of the two vehicles 
cleanse the afflictive hindrances. Those who have a nature inclined to the bodhisattva 
practices cleanse both kinds of hindrances” (T30:1581.888b9–11).  
39 Here DSYZ has wei (違, “differ”) instead of yuan (遠, “distance”), which makes more 
sense.  
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drances. Nescient obscuration directly distorts clear understanding, and 
shrouds closely. Here the meaning of cognitive obstruction is strong, and 
hence they are called cognitive hindrances. Innate nescience is not 
active here, and is not able to instigate activity or invite painful retribu-
tion. The distress it brings about is slight, and thus it is not called afflic-
tive hindrances. 
1.3   Stages of their elimination 
次明斷處。略有二階。第一大小相對分別。二者直就大乘世出世間
相對分別。 
Next is the elucidation of the stages of elimination. There are two main 
levels. The first is that of the distinctions between the greater and lesser 
vehicles. The second is the direct access to the distinctions between the 
mundane and transmundane within the greater vehicle. 
1.3.1 Distinction between Greater and Lesser Vehicles 
大小對中義別三門。 
The distinction according to greater and lesser [vehicle] is set out in 
three parts. 





First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is empha-
sized. Adherents of the two vehicles only remove the afflictive hin-
drances, and only bodhisattvas extinguish the cognitive hindrances. It is 
not the case that the adherents of the two vehicles do not partially re-
move the cognitive hindrances. But since the hindrances that are remov-
ed are negligible, the subtle is de-emphasized in favor of the coarse, and 
thus they are not discussed. It is not the case that the bodhisattvas do 
not remove afflictions. But since those that are removed are relatively 
insignificant, the coarse is de-emphasized in favor of the subtle, and 
therefore they are not mentioned. 
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1.3.1.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior 
二者優劣相形。二乘解劣但斷煩惱。菩薩治廣二障雙除。故地持云。
聲聞緣覺煩惱障淨非智障淨。菩薩種姓具足二淨。 
Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Adherents of the 
two vehicles are inferior in their understanding, and only remove the af-
flictions. Bodhisattvas subdue [mental disturbances] broadly, removing 
both kinds of hindrances together. Therefore the BBh says: “Śrāvakas and 
pratyekabuddhas cleanse afflictive hindrances; they do not cleanse cog-
nitive hindrances. Bodhisattvas thoroughly cleanse both kinds of hin-
drances” (T30:1581.888b10–11).  
1.3.1.3 Comprehensive view from the perspective of reality 
三者據實通論。二乘菩薩二障雙除。 
Third is the comprehensive view from the perspective of reality. In actu-
ality, the adherents of the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas both re-
move both kinds of hindrances. 




As for the distinctions between the mundane and supramundane in the 
Greater Vehicle, all stages up to the stages of understanding and practice 
are called “mundane”. The stages from the first ground and upward are 
called “supramundane”. There are four further distinctions to be made 
here. 
1.3.2.1 Ignoring the coarse and elaborating the subtle 
一廢麤論細。地前菩薩於彼二障一向未斷。初地以上二障竝除。故
涅槃中宣說。地前具煩惱性。 
First, ignoring the coarse and elaborating the subtle. Bodhisattvas who 
have not yet entered the grounds do not in any way eliminate the two 
kinds of hindrances. But from the time they enter into the first ground 
and above, they remove both kinds of hindrances together. Therefore 
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the Nirvāṇa Sutra says that bodhisattvas prior to their entry into the 
grounds are fully afflicted in their nature (see T12:374.396c25 ff.),  
1.3.2.2 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is 
emphasized 
二者隱顯互論。地前世間但斷煩惱。初地以上唯除智障。 
Second is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is em-
phasized. Those who are in the mundane levels prior to the grounds only 
remove the afflictive hindrances. Those in the first ground and above 
only remove the cognitive hindrances. 
1.3.2.3 Mutual defining of superior and inferior 
三者優劣相形。地前解劣唯除煩惱。地上解勝二障雙斷。 
Third is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Those who are in 
the stages prior to the grounds are weak in their understanding and only 
remove afflictive hindrances. Those who are in the first ground and a-
bove are of superior understanding and remove both kinds of hindrances 
together. 
1.3.2.4 In actuality 
四者據實。通世及出世二障雙除。相狀如何。 
Fourth is the actuality of the situation. In fact, practitioners at both the 
mundane and supramundane levels remove both kinds of hindrances. 
How is this explained? 
1.3.2.4.1 Afflictive hindrances 
煩惱障中有其二種。一者子結。二者果結。子結煩惱地前所斷。果
縛煩惱地上所除。 
There are two kinds of afflictive hindrances: those that are bound at the 
level of seed, and those that are bound at the level of fruition. Seed-
bound afflictions are removed prior to the grounds. Fruition-bound af-
flictions are removed from the first ground and above. 







Within the seed-bound afflictions there are two further types. The first 
are afflictions proper that arise with intentional activity. The second are 
habit energies that arise without effort. The afflictions proper are fully 
eliminated by śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and those with the nature [for 
bodhisattvahood]. The habitually-bound afflictions are finished from the 
stage of seed-nature up to the first ground. Therefore the Bodhisattva-
bhūmi-śāstra says: “During the first asaṃkhya kalpa one passes through 
the stages of understanding and practice42 and enters into the ground of 
joy43” (T30:1581.945a23). One eliminates the predominating tendencies 
within the afflictions of negative rebirths. Unwholesome afflictions pro-
per are called “predominating”; habituation is called “within”. These are 





八地以上除彼餘習。故地持云。「第三阿僧祇斷除習氣入最上住。 」  
Within the fruition-bound, there are also two types. The first are the af-
flictions proper that are produced consciously. The second are the afflic-
tions proper that arise naturally by habituation. Attachment to the Bud-
dha, attachment to bodhi and so forth are gradually removed starting 
-------------------------------------------------- 
40 Following DSYZ, removing the extraneous xi (習) here.  
41 Following DSYZ, replacing xiang (相) with chu (初).  
42 A reference to the ten understandings (shi jie 十解) and ten practices (shi xing 十行) 
in the 41-stage or 52-stage bodhisattva path. In Mahāyāna texts, these stages are usu-
ally characterized as being the final levels of mundane (shijian 世間) cognition and 
practice.  
43 The first of the ten grounds (Skt. pramuditā bhūmiḥ).  
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from the level of the first ground, up to the level of the ground of im-
movability (the eighth ground, acalā-bhūmiḥ), at which point they are 
completely extinguished. As the BBh says: “During the second asaṃkhya 
kalpa one passes from the seventh abode and enters into the eighth 
ground” (similar to T30:1581.952b25). With the extremely subtle afflic-
tions all extinguished without remainder, at the eighth ground and a-
bove one removes his habit energies. As the BBh says: “In the third asaṃ-
khya kalpa, one removes the remaining habit energies and enters into the 
highest abode” (T30:1581.952b27).  




There are also two kinds of cognitive hindrances. The first is confusion 
in regard to appearances; the second is confusion in regard to reality. 
The dharmas pursued by unenlightened sentient beings are called ap-
pearances. Not able to understand these and asserting them to be ori-
ginally nonexistent is called confusion. The nature of the tathāgatagarbha 
is said to be real; not being able to fully fathom this is called confusion. 
The nescience of confusion in regard to appearances is removed before 
the grounds; nescience of confusion in regard to reality is removed after 
entry into the grounds. 





There are two kinds of nescience of confusion in regard to appearances. 
The first is when, in one’s confusion in regard to appearances, one posits 
natures. The second is when, in one’s confusion in regard to natures, one 
posits appearances. “Confusion in regard to appearances” means that 
one takes the vacuous conglomerations of delusive dharmas as appear-
ances. Not knowing that these are vacuous conglomerations and con-
structing definite appearances is called confusion. “Confusion in regard 
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to natures” means that the dharmas that arise from unenlightened discri-
mination, while not having a nature, are understood to have a nature. 
Misconstruing these [natureless dharmas], one posits dependently-arisen 
appearances. The nescience of confusion in regard to appearances is ful-
ly extinguished by śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas in the 
stage of seed-nature. The nescience of confusion in regard to natures is 
thoroughly and completely eradicated from the stages of cultivation of 
the seed-nature up to the first ground. 








There are also two kinds of nescience of confusion in regard to reality. 
The first is confusion in regard to the appearance of reality; the second is 
confusion in regard to the nature of reality. The quiescent uncondition-
ed state is the appearance of reality. Since one is not able to know this 
still unconditioned state, it is called confusion in regard to appearances. 
Buddha dharmas as numerous as the grains of sand in the Ganges in truth 
originally have this reality. Not being able to thoroughly realize this is 
called delusion in regard to the nature [of reality]. 
Explanations of the removal of these two kinds of nescience are not 
firmly set. If we rely on the DBh, then the confusion in regard to appear-
ances is removed from the first ground up to the sixth ground. Therefore, 
its attainment is understood to clarify the tolerance of accordance.44 In 
the seventh ground and above one removes the confusion in regard to 
the nature of reality. Therefore one realizes the essence of the tolerance 
based on the realization of the nonarising of all dharmas. If we follow the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
44 Shunren (順忍): tolerance of accordance. The third of the five tolerances (wu ren 五忍). 
Also one of three tolerances (san ren 三忍). These also represent the fourth, fifth and 
sixth of the ten bhūmis; DDB.  
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Nirvāṇa Sutra, the confusion in regard to the appearances of reality is re-
moved at the ninth ground and below. Therefore it is called “seeing the 
Buddha Nature with one’s ears”. From the tenth ground and above, one 
removes the confusion in regard to the nature of reality. Therefore it is 
called “seeing the Buddha Nature with one’s eyes” (T12:374.528a6). In 
order to seek out the two hindrances and thoroughly remove them from 
beginning to end, we must indeed remove the coarse! 
1.4   Antidotes to the hindrances 
次辨第四對障辨脫。斷煩惱得心解脫。斷除智障得慧解脫。是義云
何分別有二。 
Next is the fourth part, the explanation of the antidotes to the hindran-
ces. When one removes the afflictive hindrances, one attains the mental 
liberation. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, one attains the 
wisdom liberation.45 How is it that liberation comes to be bifurcated into 
two distinct types? 






[This is explained] first [from the perspective] of that which is de-
emphasized and that which is emphasized. With the elimination of the 
afflictive hindrances one attains the mental liberation of the buddhas 
-------------------------------------------------- 
45 Hui jietuo (慧解脫): wisdom liberation (Skt. prajñā-vimukti) and the prior mental liberation 
(xin jietuo 心解脫; Skt. ceto-vimukti) are early forms of the bifurcation of liberation 
into the two aspects of freedom from affliction and freedom from nescience found in 
the Abhidharma literature, which are developed into two-hindrance theory in Tathā-
gatagarbha and Yogâcāra texts. In the case of the wisdom liberation, one relies on un-
defiled wisdom to eliminate the two mental disturbances of views and mental distur-
bances of perceptions (jianhuo 見惑, sihuo 思惑); DDB; see also Translation §2.4 
below.  
46 Here, and in the next line, replacing bian (遍) with pian (偏), following DSYZ. 
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and bodhisattvas at the level of the conventional truth. With the elimi-
nation of the cognitive hindrances one attains the wisdom liberation at 
the level of the ultimate truth. How so? Since the afflictions defile at the 
level of phenomena, the elimination of affliction is the mental liberation 
at the level of conventional truth, [which] eliminates affliction. Even 
though in principle one is liberated while pursuing all kinds of merit, it is 
named based on its primary focus, and therefore is one-sidedly called 
mental liberation. Since nescience obstructs the principle, the elimi-
nation of nescience is the wisdom liberation at the level of the ultimate 
truth, [which] eliminates nescience. At this time, in principle one is libe-
rated in the consummation of all kinds of merit, but it is one-sidedly 
called wisdom liberation. 
1.4.2 Distinguishing the broadly and narrowly applied antidotes 
二者對障寬狹分別。斷煩惱障 唯除事中染愛心故、世諦心脫。斷
智障時、除無明地、及斷事中麤無明。故二諦慧脫。此初番竟。 
Second is the distinction of broadly and narrowly applied antidotes. 
Since the elimination of the afflictive hindrances only entails the remov-
al of attached defiled mental states with respect to phenomenal activity, 
it is the mental liberation in the conventional truth. When one elimi-
nates the cognitive hindrances, one removes the entrenchment of nesci-
ence, as well as the coarse nescience that functions with respect to phe-
nomenal activity. Therefore the wisdom liberation occurs at the level of 
both truths. This ends the first level of interpretation. 
2   Second level 
第二番中亦有四門。一、定障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、
對障辨脫。 
In the second level of interpretation there are also four parts: (1) defin-
ing the hindrances; (2) explanation of terminology; (3) stages of elimina-
tion; and (4) antidotes to the hindrances. 
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As for determining their characteristics, how do we know that the bind-
ing at the level of nature of the five entrenchments constitutes the afflic-
tive hindrances and nescience in regard to phenomena constitutes the 
cognitive hindrances? As the Nirvāṇa Sutra says: “When one eliminates 
all craving, ill-will, and delusion, etc., one attains the mental liberation. 
When there is no obstruction to be found in all knowables, one attains 
the wisdom liberation” (T12:374.515b14–17). Craving, ill-will, and delu-
sion are none other than the afflictions of the five entrenchments bind-
ing at the level of nature. When one attains nonobstruction of all know-
ables, you should know that it constitutes the removal of ignorance in 
regard to phenomena. Furthermore, the DBh takes the nonobstruction of 
the Buddha’s [wisdom] as the liberation wisdom. You should know that 
this is none other than the removal of nescience in regard to phenomena. 
Extricating oneself from delusional defilement is the mental liberation. 
You should know that this [delusional defilement] is none other than the 
binding of the five entrenchments at the level of nature, which is, in turn, 
the afflictive hindrances. As the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra says: 
“The Tathāgata removes two kinds of nescience: the first is defiled; the 
second is undefiled” (T28:1552.921b26-27). Defiled nescience is equiva-
lent to the afflictions bound to the natures of the five entrenchments. 
Undefiled nescience is equivalent to the mental state of nescience in re-
gard to phenomena. If you see it in this way, it will be clear that the 
binding at the level of nature in the five entrenchments constitutes the 
afflictive hindrances, and the nescience that occurs in regard to pheno-
mena constitutes the cognitive hindrances. 
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2.2   Explanation of terminology 
次釋其名。五住性結能起分段變易生死。勞亂人故、名煩惱障。事
中闇惑能障如來種知明解、是故說此爲智障也。 
Next is the explanation of terminology. The binding at the level of the 
natures of the five entrenchments serves to bring about both delimited 
saṃsāra and the saṃsāra of subtle transformation.47 Because they bring 
distress to people, they are called the afflictive hindrances. Obscuration 
with regard to phenomena serves to obstruct the clear understanding of 
the Tathāgata’s lineage. Therefore they are called the cognitive hindran-
ces. 
2.3   Stages of elimination 
次辨斷處。處別有三。一者、世出世間相對分別、二者、功用無功
用相對分別、三者、因果相對分別。 
Next is the articulation of the stages of elimination. There are three 
kinds of distinctions in these stages. The first is the distinction between 
mundane and transmundane. The second is the distinction between ap-
plication of effort and effortlessness. The third is the distinction between 
causes and effects.  
2.3.1 Distinction between mundane and transmundane 
就初對中義別有二。 
Within the first there are two further connotations. 






47 See ŚDS, T12:353.219c20-24. 
48 Based on DSYZ, replacing song (訟) with song (誦). The source text says: 在其中。一切
世間書論技藝文誦咒術不可窮盡。佛子。譬如香山王。一切諸香集在其中。一切諸
香取不可盡 (T26:1522.201a16–17). Also see DSYZ at T44:1851.563a10.  
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The first is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is 
emphasized. Prior to the grounds one removes the binding to the five 
entrenchments at the level of nature. This is because the practitioner 
abandons appearances and orients himself to thusness. From the first 
ground and above he removes the cognitive hindrances. This is because 
once one is in the grounds, he aligns himself with the dharma realm of 
cognitive experience, thoroughly penetrating all dharmas without impe-
diment. Therefore the DBh says: “At the level of the first ground one can-
not fully extinguish all kinds of worldly [essays, technology,] verses, and 
magical arts” (T26:1522.201a16–17). 
2.3.1.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior 
二者優劣相形。地前菩薩唯除煩惱。初地以上智行寬廣、二障雙除。 
Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Bodhisattvas at 
the level prior to the grounds only remove afflictive hindrances. From 
the first ground and above wisdom functions broadly, and they remove 
both hindrances. 
2.3.2 Distinction between application of effort and effortlessness 
第二對中義別有二。 
Within the second, there are also two further distinctions in connota-
tion. 






First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is empha-
sized. At the level of the seventh ground and below, one only removes 
the afflictive hindrances. From the eighth ground and above, one extir-
pates the cognitive hindrances. It is like the purification of Buddha lands 
that takes place within the eighth ground, where one removes nescience 
with respect to all kinds of physical existence. In the ninth ground one 
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gets through the initial mental functions, extirpating all nescience asso-
ciated with the mental functions. In the tenth ground one attains mas-
tery in regard to all dharmas, eliminating all nescience associated with all 
dharmas. These are all part of the removal of nescience in regard to 
phenomena. 
2.3.2.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior 
二者優劣相形。七地以還唯除煩惱。八地以上二障雙除。 
Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. In the seventh 
ground and below one only removes the afflictive hindrances. In the 
eighth ground and above one removes both hindrances. 
2.3.3 Distinction between causes and effects 
第三對中義別有二。 
Third is the distinction between causes and effects, which has two con-
notations. 




The first is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is em-
phasized. Up to the adamantine stage49 one eliminates the afflictive hin-
drances. While within the ground of the Tathāgata, omniscience be-
comes active, and one thoroughly understands the distinctions among 
all phenomena, eliminating the cognitive hindrances. Since nescience in 
regard to phenomena is difficult to remove, it is not completely removed 
until one achieves Buddhahood. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
49 The adamantine or diamond stage (jin’gangwei 金剛位; *vajra-bhūmi) is the final stage 
of the bodhisattva path, where bodhisattvas enter into the adamantine absorption 
(jin’gangyuding 金剛喩定). In Yogâcāra, this stage is equivalent to virtual enlighten-
ment (dengjue 等覺).  
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2.3.3.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior 
二者優劣相形。金剛以還、唯斷煩惱。如來果德二障雙斷。 
Second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. From the ada-
mantine ground and below, one removes only the afflictive hindrances. 
From the point of the fruition of the merit of the Tathāgata, one removes 
both hindrances. 





Next is the elucidation of the antidotes to the hindrances. When one re-
moves the afflictive hindrances, he attains the mental liberation. When 
one removes the cognitive hindrances, he attains the wisdom liberation. 
There are two kinds of mental liberation. The first is the conventional 
mental state of buddhas and bodhisattvas; the second is the ultimate 
mental state of buddhas and bodhisattvas. Because one eliminates the 
four entrenchments, he attains liberation from the perspective of the 
conventional truth. Because one eliminates nescience, he attains the 
mental liberation from the perspective of the ultimate truth. As for the 
wisdom liberation, one attains liberation by the illumination of the 
all-inclusive understanding of mundane phenomena. 
3   Third level 
第三番中亦有四門。一、定其障相。二、釋障名。三、明斷處。四、
對障辨脫。 
The third level again has four parts: (1) defining the characteristics of 
the hindrances; (2) explanation of terminology; (3) stages of their elimin-
ation; and (4) antidotes applied to specific hindrances. 
3.1   Defining the characteristics of the hindrances 
言定相者云何得知。五住性結及事無知爲煩惱障。分別之智以爲智
障。如勝鬘云。「五住及起同名煩惱。」 明知五住及事無智是煩惱






How are the characteristics defined [in this level of interpretation]? The 
binding of the five entrenchments at the level of their nature as well as 
nescience in regard to phenomena comprise the afflictive hindrances, 
while discriminating cognition is regarded as the cognitive hindrances. 
As the ŚDS says: “The five entrenchments along with their arisen states 
are collectively called affliction.”50 From this we know that the five 
entrenchments and nescience in regard to phenomena constitute the 
afflictive hindrances. As for the association of discriminating cognition 
with the afflictive hindrances, this is like the passage in the Ratnagotra-
vibhāga, which says: 
There are four kinds of hindrances that impede the attain-
ment of the Tathāgata’s purity, self, bliss, and perma-
nence.51 The first is the appearance of dependent origina-
tion, which is called the ground of nescience. It is due to 
this hindrance that one does not experience the authentic 
bliss of the Tathāgata. The second is the appearance of cau-
sation, which is called uncontaminated activity. It is due to 
this hindrance that one does not experience the authentic 
self. The third is the appearance of arising, which is called 
the mind-made body.52 It is due to this hindrance that one 
-------------------------------------------------- 
50 I have not found in the ŚDS any place where it explicitly mentions the five entrench-
ments as a unit as cited here. In the passage most similar to this in that text, it men-
tions only the four entrenchments (si zhudi 四住地); see T12:353.220a2.  
51 Known as the “four attributes” (si de 四德). Purity, self, bliss, and permanence are 
four positive attributes of Buddhist religious experience that are taught as an antidote 
to the negativity of teachings such as that of emptiness (Skt. catvāraḥ guṇa). One of the 
best known sources for this notion is the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. These four notions are denied 
by early Buddhism, Abhidharma, and Yogâcāra, but affirmed by Tathāgatagarbha/
Buddha Nature-based traditions. 
52 The mind-made body (yisheng shen 意生身, also written yicheng shen 意成身, Skt. ma-
nomaya-kāya) is a body as born out of a certain kind of intent or mindfulness: thus the 
bodhisattva body, śrāvaka body, buddha-bodies, etc. The body of a buddha is not arisen 
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does not experience authentic bliss. The fourth is the 
appearance of disintegration, which is called saṃsāra of 
subtle transformation. It is due to this hindrance that one 





Since it has been stated that the hindrance of uncontaminated activity 
obstructs the experience of the authentic self, we can know for certain 
that the object-discriminating cognition is the cognitive hindrance. This 
interpretation can also be seen in the teaching on the sixth ground in 
the DBh, where the causal condition for the purification of the cognitive 
hindrances is the nondiscriminating samādhi of emptiness. By not dis-
criminating, the cognitive hindrances are purified (T26:1522.172b21–22). 
From this, we can clearly know that discriminating cognition constitutes 





Additionally, the Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra says: “I attain my nirvāṇa/ In the ces-
sation of the deluded intelligence that cognizes the knowable.”53 When 
one extirpates the intelligence that cognizes the knowable, then that is 
called nirvāṇa (T16:670.496b2). By this we clearly know that the deceptive 
intelligence that is extinguished is a hindrance. Furthermore, Nāgârjuna 
says: “This kind of initial mental application and subsequent discursive 
reasoning, when seen from below, is good, but when seen from the level 
of the second meditation, it is faulty. This is the case up to the noncon-
ceptual state, which when seen from below is good, but when seen from 
the perspective of the supramundane path, is faulty” (source not loca-
-------------------------------------------------- 
from the five skandhas – it is created out of consciousness. This body can also be so 
created by a bodhisattva in the bhūmi levels, in order to aid sentient beings.  
53 The line in the sutra is slightly different: 妄想爾炎識 此滅我涅槃. 
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ted). The discriminating cognition is like this. When seen from the con-
ventional perspective it is good, but when seen from the perspective of 
reality it is also faulty. Since it has been identified as being faulty, how 
could it not be a hindrance? 
3.2   Explanation of terminology 
次釋其名。五住性結及事無知體 是闇惑勞亂之法故、名煩惱。緣
智礙眞故名智障。 
Next is the explanation of terminology. Since binding at the level of the 
natures of the five entrenchments as well as the essence of nescience in 
regard to phenomena are all dharmas of delusion and travail, they are 
called afflictions. Since discriminating cognition obstructs reality, it is 










Question: This cognition is able to disclose reality, which is why it is de-
scribed in the scriptures as a “cause of understanding”. Why then do you 
here call it a cognitive hindrance?  
It is because there are multiple interpretations of reality that it is 
called a hindrance. It is like medicine being used to cure a disease. If you 
do not get rid of the medicine (after the disease has been cured), then 
the medicine turns into an affliction. This is the same kind of case. How 
does it obstruct the truth? It is as the Vimalakīrti-sūtra says: “Extinction is 
bodhi, since it extinguishes all appearances.” In this case, cognition is 
-------------------------------------------------- 
54 The Vimalakīrti-sūtra has she (捨) instead of duan (斷).  
55 According to DSYZ, correcting shi (是) to jian (見).  
56 DSYZ has zhi (智) instead of zhi (知).  
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appearance, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Non-contemplation is 
bodhi, since it is free from all connections to objects.” In this case, cogni-
tion is connection to objects, and thus it constitutes a hindrance. “Non-
activity is bodhi, since there is no memory.” In this case, cognition is me-
mory, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Elimination [of views] is 
bodhi, since views are abandoned.” In this case, cognition consists of 
views, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Extrication is bodhi, since 
one is freed from deceptive thought.” In this case, cognition consists of 
deceptive thought, and hence it constitutes a hindrance. “Obstructions 
are bodhi, since they obstruct all wishes.” In this case, cognition is a wish, 
and therefore it constitutes a hindrance (T14:475.542b23–28). Bodhi is 
true illumination. The nature of this cognition is obscuration, and there-
fore it is a hindrance. It is like the way the experience of suffering at the 
conventional level is in nature suffering induced by the changes that oc-
cur in conditioned existence. Examples of this sort [are so numerous that 
they] cannot be explained in detail, but since all act contrary to authen-
tic virtue, they are called hindrances. 
3.3   Levels of elimination 
次辨斷處。斷處有二。一者地前地上相對分別。二者直就地上世出
世間相對分別。就初對中義別有二。 
Next is the articulation of the levels of elimination, of which there are 
two: the first is discrimination between being prior to the grounds or in 
the grounds. The second is the discrimination of mundane and trans-
mundane directly attained in the grounds. 
3.3.1 Comparison of elimination prior to the grounds and in the 
grounds 







 The Two Hindrances: Huiyuan’s “Er zhangyi”  259 
 
First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is empha-
sized. At the stages of understanding and practice and prior, the appear-
ances of increase are cultivated. Hence one eliminates the cognitive 
hindrances. From the first ground and above the appearances of aban-
donment are cultivated, and hence one removes the cognitive hin-
drances. How is it that the appearances of increase are able to remove 
the afflictions? The afflictions bring distress precisely because of their 
obscuring activity. Up to the first ground one has cultivated clear under-
standing; the discriminating consciousness continues to expand as 
obscuration is gradually removed. When one reaches the stages of un-
derstanding and practice, one’s clear understanding increases, and ob-
scuring hindrances are totally extinguished; this is what is called “elimi-
nation”. How is it that the appearances of abandonment are able to eli-
minate the cognitive hindrances? The cognitive hindrances are proble-
matic precisely due to discrimination. From the first ground and above, 
one totally realizes the truth for oneself, and the cultivation of condi-
tions is gradually removed. The extirpation of the error of discrimina-
tion is called the elimination of the cognitive hindrances. 
3.3.1.2 Mutual defining of superior and inferior 
二優劣相形。地前菩薩唯斷煩惱。初地以上對治深廣二障雙除。若
論事識解滅者、地前亦得。但不論耳。 
The second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. Before the 
grounds, bodhisattvas only eliminate afflictions. From the first ground 
and above they counteract both kinds of hindrances extensively, such 
that both are removed. 




Next is the discrimination between mundane and transmundane in the 
grounds. The first, second, and third grounds are called mundane. The 
fourth ground and above are called transmundane. 
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3.3.2.1 The contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is 
emphasized 






First is the contrast between what is de-emphasized and what is empha-
sized. The mundane practices from the third ground and below remove 
the afflictive hindrances. The supramundane authentic wisdom ope-
rating in the fourth ground and above removes the cognitive hindrances. 
Why is it that the mundane practices remove the afflictive hindrances? 
As the DBh explains, in the first ground, one eliminates the hindrances of 
the appearance of self that is experienced by the unenlightened world-
lings (T26:1522.127a12). The hindrance of the unenlightened view of self 
is none other than the entrenchment of reifying views. In the second 
ground, one removes the afflictions that have the potential to lead to 
infractions of the Vinaya. Afflictions that lead to infractions of the Vina-
ya are included in the entrenchments of attachment to desire, attach-
ment to form, and attachment to objects in the formless realm. In the 
third ground one removes the hindrances of delusion in regard to dhar-
mas such as those that obscure the marks of hearing, consideration, and 
practice of the Buddha’s teachings. Obscuration of marks is equivalent to 
the entrenchment of nescience. Hence it is clear that in the mundane le-
vel of the grounds one only eliminates the afflictive hindrances. 
3.3.2.1.2 Cognitive hindrances 
云何出世能斷智障。智障有三。 
How is it that [supramundane wisdom] is able to remove the cognitive 
hindrances? There are three kinds of cognitive hindrances. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
57 Here and in the next phrase I replace huo (惑) with jie (戒), following DSYZ, which al-
lows this line to make sense.  
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3.3.2.1.2.1 Hindrance of knowing 
一是智障、所謂空有之心。 
First is the hindrance of knowing, which means the mental states of 
[attachment to] emptiness and existence. 





The second is the hindrance of essence, which means the essence of 
constructed spiritual cognition. What sort of thing is this? It means that 
this object-discriminating cognition accurately observes that all pheno-
mena are neither existent nor nonexistent, which means that one lets go 
of the prior obstruction of discrimination between existence and non-
existence. Even though one lets go of the obstruction brought about by 
the discrimination between existence and nonexistence, it is still the 
case that seeing is already taken to be subjective observation, with 
thusness being the object of that observation. When seeing is already 
subjective observation, the mind differs from thusness. When thusness is 
taken as the object of observation, thusness is distinguished from the 
mind. Since, in seeing, the mind is already distinguished from thusness, 
one is not able to dissolve the obstruction of the constructed spiritual 
cognition and this is called the hindrance of essence. 




The third is the [hindrance due to] notions of correction. If we discuss 
[all three types] together, we can say that the prior two kinds of cogni-
tive hindrances also include this notion of correction. It is just that in 
this particular case, this aspect is disclosed thoroughly, and thus it is 
-------------------------------------------------- 
58 Replacing xiang (相) with xiang (想), following DSYZ.  
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one-sidedly labeled “[hindrances due to the notion of] correction”. Yet 
this notion of correction is also [a kind of] discriminating cognition. In 
getting rid of the prior obstruction of the spiritual cognition, the true 
mind merges with thusness. Even though it returns to its unity with 
thusness, if we discuss its essence, it is none other than a dharma of the 
arising and ceasing of the seventh consciousness. Since it obstructs the 
authentic realization of the wisdom of neither arising nor cessation, it is 
called a hindrance. 
障別如此。治斷云何。始從四地乃至七地斷除智障。入第八地斷除
體障。八地以上至如來地斷除治想。 
So much for the distinctions between the cognitive hindrances. What a-
bout their removal? Starting from the first ground, continuing up to the 
seventh ground, the hindrance of knowing is eliminated. Entering into 
the eighth ground, one removes the hindrance of essence. From the 
eighth ground up to the ground of the Tathāgata, one removes the hin-
drance of the notion of correction. 
3.3.2.1.3 Removal of the three kinds of cognitive hindrances 






How does one remove the hindrance of knowing? At the fourth, fifth, 
and sixth ground one contemplates emptiness and refutes existence, dis-
carding the cognition that discriminates and grasps at existence. There-
fore this is elaborated in detail in the DBh. At the fourth ground one 
penetratingly observes that all dharmas neither arise nor cease, discard-
ing the hindrance of pride in one’s understanding of the Dharma. In the 
fifth ground one penetratingly observes the equality of the Buddhadhar-
ma of the three divisions of time, and thus discards the pride resulting 
from discriminating the purity of one’s body. In the sixth ground one pe-
netratingly observes the equality of all dharmas, and thus discards the 
pride resulting from the discrimination of defilement and purity. These 
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are all states of mind where the observation of emptiness destroys at-
tachment to existence. In the seventh ground one observes the thusness 
of dharmas, discarding the prior mental state of discriminating and 
grasping at emptiness. Freedom from these obstructions is called the eli-
mination of the hindrances of knowing. 







What is the removal of the hindrance of essence in the eighth ground? 
While in the prior seventh ground, even though one observes the thus-
ness of dharmas, this is still a mental state of “having seen”, and is to be 
regarded as a subjective observation, with thusness being that which is 
observed. It is based on this seeing that the mind differs from thusness, 
and one is unable to exercise the vast, effortless immovability that places 
one into the eighth ground. In breaking this kind of obstruction, one 
penetratingly observes that outside of thusness, there is originally no 
mind, and that outside of the mind, there is no thusness. [Given that] 
outside of thusness, there is no mind, there is no mind that differs from 
thusness; [given that] outside of the mind, there is no thusness, there is 
no thusness that is different from the mind. With there being no mind 
that differs from thusness, one does not see subjective knowing. With 
there being no thusness that differs from mind, one does not see that 
which is known. With subjective and objective already gone, they vanish 
into the same single mark. This is the meaning of directly abandoning 
the exertion of discrimination. Since one abandons this exertion, activity 
is the same as thusness, and the resultant vast immovability is called en-
try into the eighth ground. The moment this merit is complete it is 
called the elimination of the hindrances of essence. 
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How does one eliminate the notion of correction from the eighth ground 
up to the ground of the Tathāgata? Even though one has been removing 
hindrances of essence up to the level of the eighth ground, the notion of 
correction still lingers. Therefore the exegesis of the eighth ground says: 
“At this level of the eighth ground, even though there are no notions of 
hindrance, it is not the case that there are not notions of correction” 
(source not found). Yet this notion of correction is, from the eighth 
ground, gradually removed, until it is fully exhausted at the ground of 
the Tathāgata. How is it eliminated? Because discrimination subsides, 
the real appears directly before one. The dharma of enlightenment is 
only real; from beginning to end it lacks falsity. With this vision of the 
real there is no power in the false, and therefore one is able to cause the 
false to be corrected. The former does not produce the latter, and the lat-
ter does not give rise to the former. In this, they are completely extin-
guished. 




The second is the mutual defining of superior and inferior. In the first, 
second, and third grounds one overcomes the weaker hindrances, only 
eliminating the afflictions. From the fourth ground and above one 
deeply and widely treats the two hindrances, removing both of them. 
Comprehensively speaking, you should know that from the first ground 
up to the Buddha ground both hindrances are removed together in every 
thought-moment. Discriminating cognition gradually clarifies, elimi-
nating the afflictive hindrances. Real dharmas gradually manifest, extin-
-------------------------------------------------- 
59 Following DSYZ, changing xiang (相) to xiang (想).  
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guishing the cognitive hindrances. Correction and elimination occur like 
this. 







Next is the articulation of the application of antidotes. From this per-
spective, when one eliminates the afflictive hindrances, both kinds of 
liberation arise together. When one removes the cognitive hindrances, 
both kinds of liberation appear together. How does this happen? When 
the previously applied corrective practices eliminate the afflictive hin-
drances, the path that is the agent of the elimination must arise in de-
pendence on the real. The real that is depended upon always adjusts ac-
cording to falsity. Therefore, based on deluded practice, one motivates 
the real mind. This allows it to be that within this reality, the qualities of 
the two kinds of liberation are produced. Even though the qualities of 
the real are produced, they become blended in with the discriminating 
cognition of the seventh consciousness, and due to this, they cover the 
real so that its true qualities are not apparent. When one removes this 
cognition, the qualities of the real become apparent. It is like when one 
presses a seal of completion of the summer retreat onto clay, giving rise 
to text and image on the clay. Even though there is now text on the clay, 
while the seal is still on the clay it is not yet visible – and it only becomes 
visible after one removes the seal. The result of removing the discrimi-
nating cognition is like this. 
The system of the two hindrances is difficult to fathom, so for the 
time being let us just be satisfied with a brief summary of the main 
-------------------------------------------------- 
60 Following DSYZ, changing la (臈) to la (臘) here and next instance.  
61 Following DSYZ, changing fu (䨱) to fu (覆).  
62 Following DSYZ, changing shu (樹) to biao (標).  
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points. [This is where the discussion of the hindrances in the DSYZ ends. 
The initial part of the discussion that continues from this in the com-
mentary on the AMF still has some relevance, so we follow this a bit fur-
ther, stopping at the point where the commentary on the AMF returns to 





The two hindrances as introduced in the AMF are the same as those of 
the second level of interpretation provided here. i.e., the manifest as-
pects of the five entrenchments (the four entrenchments, including 
their active manifestations) are equivalent to the afflictive hindrances, 
and nescience, including its active manifestations, is equivalent to the 
cognitive hindrances. Therefore the in BBh, nescience, regarded as delu-
sion, is equivalent to the cognitive hindrances. If we discuss this again 
following the interpretation from the perspective of nescience, then the 
myriad troubles that arise from nescience can also be called afflictions, 
with the entrenchment of nescience alone being regarded as the cogni-
tive hindrances. Therefore in this treatise, the nescience entrenchments 
alone are regarded as the cognitive hindrances, while the myriad trou-





Question: In this case, into which of the entrenchments does the ne-
science of grasping at natures within the phenomenal consciousnesses 
fall? And into which of the entrenchments does the view of attachment 
to desire within the false consciousness fall? 
Answer: There is no fixed answer to this, but there are two general 
interpretations. The first is that from the perspective of what is de-
emphasized and what is emphasized. The nescience of grasping at na-
tures within the phenomenal consciousnesses prioritizes what is funda-
mental, and subordinates what is derivative in assimilating the four en-
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trenchments. The view of attachment to desire within the false con-
sciousness prioritizes the derivate and subordinates the fundamental in 
assimilating all into nescience. If these two interpretations are consid-
ered together, all of the views in the false consciousness are included in 
the four entrenchments, and the nescience within the phenomenal con-
sciousness is also included within nescience. 
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